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Chapter 1
Decolonizing Bergson
The Temporal Schema of the Open and the Closed
Alia Al-Saji
The remnants and legacies of colonialisms—from geographical and spatial 
orders to material exploitation and cultural imaginaries—often continue, in 
refracted modes, in postcolonial contexts. Underlying and sustaining these 
ways of knowing (and hence of constituting meaning) are temporal frame-
works, economies of time, that persist largely unquestioned. The dichotomy of 
the open and the closed is one such schema; it not only plays a structuring 
role in colonial ways of knowing, but it also continues to be assumed in 
some theories of development in postcolonial settings. That colonized societ-
ies have a tendency to closure (being resistant to progress and to inclusivity 
and otherness) is taken to justify colonial and neocolonial paternalism.
In this chapter, I propose to attend to this well-worn temporal 
schema of open/closed by examining its elaboration in the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson and by critically parsing the possibilities his philosophy 
offers for its destabilization. Though Bergson wrote in a colonial context, 
this context barely receives acknowledgment in his work; at best, it could 
be read obliquely and ambiguously from his examples.1 That Bergson was 
politically self-aware, having engaged in diplomatic missions and polemics 
for France during the First World War and having been instrumental in the 
establishment of the League of Nations, has been well documented.2 His 
wide-ranging influence, including on the Négritude movement, means that 
this omission—or “colonial aphasia,” to borrow Ann Stoler’s term—must 
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be attended to.3 For this masks the uncomfortable resonances between 
Bergson’s philosophy of time (especially in his late work, Les deux sources de 
la morale et de la religion, published in 1932) and the temporal narratives 
that accompany and justify French colonialism. This is doubly important 
given Bergson’s uptake by more recent French philosophers, such as Gilles 
Deleuze, and by contemporary feminist and political theorists, especially 
some who identify under the umbrella of “new materialism” (including such 
diverse thinkers as Elizabeth Grosz and William Connolly). 
I mean for the project of this chapter—that of decolonizing Bergson—to 
have relevance both to Bergson studies, then, and to contemporary scholars 
of race and colonialism, who may wonder whether and how such questions 
could be addressed from within Bergson’s philosophy. Rather than attend 
simply to Bergson’s examples, I believe that a methodological approach can 
reveal how colonizing and racializing frames may be implicitly at work, no 
matter his explicit intentions. More importantly, I aim to show how ques-
tions about colonialism and racism are not simple afterthoughts, but can 
gain traction by attending to the structuring assumptions and methodolo-
gies of Bergson’s own texts. In this regard, I not only attend to Bergsonian 
philosophy critically, but I mine that philosophy for the critical resources 
and generative tools from which such decolonizing critique finds its impetus. 
Thus, I understand the project of decolonizing Bergson to have two sides—to 
be at once a critical and a creative reconfiguration of Bergsonian philosophy. 
What is at stake in decolonizing Bergson is, in my view, the very Bergsonian 
recognition of the weight of the past—the pressure it exerts on, and the differ-
ence it makes for, the present. Our pasts are structured by colonial durations 
and imperial formations. This is the past as a whole, the past as unconscious 
and multiplicitous, coexistent with the present. This past is not transcended 
and gone, but forms the invisible glue that makes itself felt in the present, 
even when selectively disregarded and unattended to in so-called postcolonial 
and postracial presents. I understand the past as atmospheric or thalassic; it 
can submerge us, buoy us up, or bog us down; it ebbs and flows. Without 
a critical mapping and recollection of this past, the weight of the past will 
only lead to confirmed and habitual routes being followed through. Creative 
reconfigurations of Bergson hence need this critical ground, but decolonizing 
critique of Bergson also requires a generative rereading of his philosophy. I 
aim to hold together both sides of this decolonizing project in my chapter, 
turning to Bergson’s last monograph in order to do so.
In Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, Bergson theorizes social 
life through the lens of what he considers a grounding difference: between 
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the open society, on the one hand, and closed societies, on the other.4 While 
the first aspires to include all human beings, linking them through love, the 
latter is based on need and obligation, defensively and antagonistically closing 
in on itself. Most contemporary critics of Bergson focus on the inclusive-
ness and “fraternity” of the open society, its borderless love and vision of 
humanity, finding there a justification for Bergson’s schema.5 In my view, 
however, it is the dichotomy of open/closed itself that is troubling. Though 
Bergson clarifies that these are tendencies, so that all existing societies are 
mixtures of openness and closure, the dichotomy nevertheless provides the 
tools for constructing a hierarchy of societies and a teleological vision of 
civilization. It is this logic that we see in contemporary cultural racism, 
where discrimination against so-called illiberal cultural-religious minorities 
(in particular, Muslims, but often also Hasidic Jews) is justified based on 
their supposed intolerance and closure to change.6 More precisely, this logic 
is often used to distinguish groups within a religion or a society, to mark 
out those who are tolerant or moderate from those who are fundamentalist.7 
But what if we were to begin with a different conceptual schema, that of 
the “half-open or ajar [entr’ouvert]” (as Vladimir Jankélévitch suggests in his 
reading of Bergson)? Could we then theorize the mixture that is society as 
more than compromise and negation? Thus, a different way of seeing and 
understanding social life might emerge: one that attends to multiplicity and 
difference without opposition and hierarchy. 
I will proceed in four steps. I begin with the recent resurgence of 
interest in Bergson, examining how Les deux sources has been taken up and 
what has been elided or made visible in those readings. Second, I look more 
closely at Les deux sources, asking how colonial formations may be on the 
horizons of this text and what hesitations they may call into being. Third, 
rather than focusing on particular examples, I ask what Bergson’s method is 
in Les deux sources and how the schema of open/closed—and more deeply, 
the couple of “primitive” and “mystic”—undergird this method. Finally, it 
is this question of method that will allow us to see the divergence between 
Les deux sources and the rest of Bergson’s philosophy; for Les deux sources 
not only introduces a new and definitive distinction into Bergson’s phi-
losophy—that of open and closed—it also puts an end to the movement 
of that philosophy by defining its possibilities as if they had already been 
given. It is by turning the tools of Bergsonian critique onto Les deux sources 
that I aim to provide an alternative to the dichotomy of open/closed—that 
of the half-open or ajar—creating in this way the (uncertain) condition of 
possibility for its decolonization.
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Reading The Two Sources
Suzanne Guerlac remarks that Les deux sources “can produce a distinct feel-
ing of estrangement, even in admirers of Bergson’s earlier works.”8 I would 
describe this feeling as one of disappointment. The reception of the book 
at the time of its publication was mixed, but the disappointment that has 
been expressed around it has had to do, in large part, with Bergson’s appeal 
to Christian mysticism (taken as the actualization of the “pure” tendency to 
openness).9 On the one hand, this was because Bergson’s account of mysti-
cism removed it from both theology and faith—making the mystic into an 
“auxiliary,” albeit a “powerful” one, of philosophy.10 On the other hand, 
the appeal to mysticism was taken to establish, once and for all, Bergson’s 
spiritualism and antirationalism (his affective and intellectual allegiance to 
Catholicism, despite being Jewish). Either way it was suspect. It is, hence, 
around the figure of the mystic that much prior critique has centered. 
In contrast, at the limit of the closed tendency lies the figure of the 
“primitive.” While there have been a number of critical studies of Bergson’s 
use of this figure, these discussions have generally been limited to the French 
literature on Bergson and almost always pivot on Bergson’s critique of Lucien 
Lévy-Bruhl.11 Such a focus sheds some positive light on Bergson’s account, 
since Bergson argues against Lévy-Bruhl that there can be only differences of 
degree between “primitive” and “civilized” humanity, both sharing a common 
nature.12 While the contrast with Lévy-Bruhl is significant for understand-
ing Les deux sources, the lack of typology in Bergson’s account of humanity 
has often meant that other ways in which Bergson constructs the difference 
between “primitive” and “civilized” go unnoticed (see the section on “Open/
Closed”). By comparison, Bergson’s “primitive” is rarely mentioned in the 
recent English-language resurgence of Bergsonism, so much so that it is a 
different Les deux sources that seems to be reflected back in these readings. 
Not only are large sections of Bergson’s text disregarded—in particular in 
the long second chapter of Les deux sources on static religion—avoiding 
the unease produced by, or the need to confront, Bergson’s secondhand 
stories of “primitives.” But it is sometimes Les deux sources as a whole that 
is avoided, as in for instance new materialist readings of Bergson. We stop 
with the methodological essays that later became La pensée et le mouvant 
(published in 1934, but the majority of which were written in the period 
1903‒23).13 I believe that the rest of my chapter will, at least indirectly, 
explain this avoidance. 
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But in case this seems like a facile criticism of contemporary Berg-
sonian interpretation, I want to include my own work in this self-critical 
gesture (having for some time avoided directly addressing the book). Les 
deux sources today tends to produce a form of discomfort that is not yet 
sufficiently self-reflective to call itself disappointment—an aphasia to recall 
Stoler’s term. In my view, this discomfort is not simply about the use of 
the term primitive in the text (which often designates, for Bergson, “the 
primitive [le primitif]” in humanity, and so what is “natural,” to be distin-
guished from “les primitifs”). It has to do, more broadly, with the way in 
which colonial formations seem to saturate the horizons and interstices of 
the text, while absent from the analysis. What runs across the contemporary 
literature on Bergson—whether English or French with a few exceptions—is 
an avoidance of this colonial question: the difference that colonial horizons 
and colonial durations might make in reading Bergson.
In this vein, Bergson’s critique of imperialism and militarism in Les 
deux sources may do more to obscure, rather than clarify, what he thinks of 
French colonialism.14 While imperialism and colonialism are often thought 
to be coextensive, this cannot be assumed in Bergson’s theory. In a 1915 
interview (later published in his Correspondances), Bergson remains uncritical 
of French colonial politics, even while he condemns German imperialism. He 
is able to hold such an aphasic position by distinguishing nations (France, 
Germany) from tribes (French colonies). Bergson argues: “[i]t cannot be said 
that these [colonies] were nations. They are warring tribes. [. . .] They had 
not proved to the world the usefulness, even to themselves, of their turbulent 
condition. So our theory [. . .] does not apply to bands of individuals in 
the state in which the inhabitants of Algiers, Morocco and our other pos-
sessions were before France took charge of them.”15 While the polemical 
and “circumstantial” character of his wartime texts mean that we must treat 
them with caution (and not on a par with his œuvres as set out in his will), 
the distinction Bergson draws is nevertheless telling. When they consider 
the colonial question, even exacting readers of Les deux sources assume that 
what Bergson says of imperialism carries over to colonialism and that, as 
Suzanne Guerlac argues, his reference to “colonies” in the conclusion of Les 
deux sources constitutes a critical gesture aimed at French colonial politics.16 
Indeed, Bergson notes that “people consider that life is not worth living 
if they cannot have comforts, pleasures, luxuries [. . .] a country considers 
itself incomplete if it has not good ports, colonies, etc. All this may lead to 
war.”17 But since the reference to “colonies” is embedded in a larger critique 
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of how nations come to see their well-being and comfort as dependent on 
territorial expansion in the age of mechanization, Bergson’s critique points 
to how luxuries come to be felt as necessities (becoming a secondary cause 
of war) and does not, in my view, problematize colonization as such. The 
critique of the luxury of spices later in the conclusion—ginger, clove, pepper, 
and cinnamon—focuses on the energy of navigation put at the service of 
acquiring these spices and glosses over the consequences that this naviga-
tion had for non-European peoples and the violence of colonization that 
it facilitated.18 And while Bergson sees colonial rivalry as destructive, this 
remains within the perspective of an intra-European problem of rival nations 
and intra-European wars.19 This means that we must look elsewhere in Les 
deux sources to uncover Bergson’s views of colonized peoples and to find a 
foothold for decolonizing critique. 
It may be time for Bergson studies to address the difficult question 
of the colonial horizons of Les deux sources, and by extension Bergson’s 
philosophy of time. Two recent books open the way for such a questioning, 
and provide opposing responses. Donna Jones, in The Racial Discourses of 
Life Philosophy, sees in Bergsonism the source for racialist narratives of the 
early twentieth century, including those taken up by the Négritude move-
ment,20 whereas, in Bergson postcolonial, Souleymane Bachir Diagne finds 
Bergson to be the common inspiration for the postcolonial philosophies of 
Léopold Senghor and Muhammad Iqbal.21 While neither of these works 
closely examines the open/closed dichotomy, or asks after its role in colonial 
formations of time, they address questions to Bergson that contemporary 
scholarship does not seem ready to take up.22 Though Jones rightly criti-
cizes Bergson’s discussion of “primitive” life, she focuses on his troubling 
examples and misses the methodological troubles this figure creates for his 
philosophy.23 Jones’s analysis also tends to misrecognize the forms of racial-
ism that Bergson’s work displays, reading it by “imbrication,” sometimes 
biologically, sometimes “noumenally,” rather than culturally, as hints in Les 
deux sources imply.24 More seriously, however, Jones focuses her critique on 
the conservation of the past in Bergson’s thought, missing in my view the 
creativity and half-openness of the Bergsonian past and undermining the 
import of her own critique.25
This dynamic conception of the past, to which I will return below, 
is more productively and accurately taken up by Muhammad Iqbal in The 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, and it is emphasized in Diagne’s 
reading of Iqbal.26 In reading Bergson and Islam through one another, 
intertwined with his exegesis of Quranic verse, Iqbal says:
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Pure time, then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our con-
scious experience, is not a string of separate, reversible instants; 
it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but 
is moving along with, and operating in, the present. And the 
future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed; it 
is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an 
open possibility. It is time regarded as an organic whole that the 
Qur’an describes as Taqdir or the destiny—a word which has 
been so much misunderstood both in and outside the world of 
Islam. [. . .] In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought 
and calculated.27 
But more than this, Iqbal draws from the Qur’an and finds in Bergson 
arguments that the whole is not already given and, hence, that “[reality] is a 
growing universe and not an already completed product which left the hand 
of its maker ages ago.”28 That the past moves along with the present, that 
it is not only preserved but supplemented, is a vital thread by which Iqbal 
thinks the question of interpretation and ijtihad as open in Islamic thought.29
While I find Iqbal’s and Diagne’s readings of Bergson more fruitful, 
I recognize the colonial context that motivates Jones’s critique, despite the 
shortcomings in her interpretation. I should note that such opposing read-
ings of Bergson are not surprising, given the ways in which his philosophy 
transforms itself between texts, attempting to create ideas that fit the phe-
nomena at stake (e.g., inner consciousness, memory, evolution) rather than 
apply ready-made concepts. But Bergson not only rejected system-building; 
he also refused to adjudicate the opposing interpretations of his thought 
that arose under the label “Bergsonism.” In this chapter, I focus on Berg-
son’s writings and method rather than the historical Bergsonisms to which 
they gave rise and whose markedly divergent interpretations and political 
tendencies have been well documented.30
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion
In what follows, I argue that decolonizing Bergson means questioning not 
merely this or that passage of Les deux sources—correcting dated accounts or 
tired images and stereotypes—but rather asking after the method that Berg-
son employs. The method of Les deux sources is grounded in the dichotomy 
of open/closed. But if, as Bergson seems to suggest, this distinction is not 
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possible without the mystic-primitive couple, then their role becomes one 
that haunts any reading of Bergson’s text. To clarify what is at stake, I will 
briefly present the structure of the book, and point to cracks where back-
ground assumptions, colonial, imperial, or otherwise, may have forced the 
argument, before turning my attention to method.
Les deux sources begins with an account of the sociality of life, not 
simply in human life but also in animal and insect life—hence appearing 
to continue and supplement the philosophy of life from L’évolution créatrice 
(1907).31 Society is, in this sense, immanent to its members;32 it is “natural” 
or “biological” (in Bergson’s broadened sense of biology).33 In human societ-
ies, cohesion is maintained through obligation, which Bergson describes as 
a force of pressure and likens to a virtual instinct.34 Although the content 
of obligation is contingent and varies, what holds together society is “the 
whole of obligation,” in other words, the necessity of having obligations or 
the habit of contracting habits.35 It is through the force of obligation that 
we first see what Bergson means by a “closed society”: Bergson introduces 
the case of war (which he argues is neither abnormal nor exceptional) to 
show that social obligations always already applied only to the members of 
a given society, to the exclusion of others.36 Bergson thus conceives of the 
tendency to closure as both constitutive of social wholes—in an inward and 
circular movement of conservation and identity-formation37—while, at the 
same time, oppositional, defensive, and exclusionary.38 It is in this sense 
that love as charity, “love of humanity” without limits, is incomparable to 
love of family or attachment to nation, requiring Bergson to search for a 
second source of morality, as we shall see.39 
Here, I note two limitations of this account that should make readers 
of Bergson hesitate. First, that obligation functions like a virtual instinct 
should already inscribe it within a movement of duration that is opening, 
just as it is being instituted and closing in on itself; instinct in L’évolution 
créatrice was vital movement and sympathy with life from within, not simply 
the sedimentation of quasi-automatic mechanisms.40 Second, the tendency 
to closure describes the materialization of social life by turning inward to 
form self-reflexive, organized, and cohesive wholes. That such wholes are 
oppositional groupings does not seem to follow immediately. This would imply 
conceiving social groups in the abstract and through negation, a mode of 
understanding that Bergson had previously criticized (arguing instead that 
living wholes, forms of order, and ways of becoming should be understood 
on their own terms, and not as privations).41
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The second source of morality also comes from life, but indirectly 
through the mediation of particular individuals: “mystics” who, through 
creative emotion, take the élan of life farther by “partial coincidence with 
the creative effort which life manifests.”42 The second source takes the form 
of a “call” or “aspiration” rather than pressure.43 It involves a teleological 
pull, transcendence, or “virtual attraction” toward—not a defined end point, 
but a form of movement that Bergson glimpses in the creative emotion of 
love.44 For Bergson, this movement is modeled by mystics’ actions and lives, 
not explicated in doctrine.45 This second source can transfigure morality into 
an open form of love that includes not only humanity, but “may extend to 
animals, to plants, to all of nature.”46 This is what defines the tendency to 
openness, which, for Bergson, breaks the circle of habit and communal or 
national obligation to make a leap in a “forward movement.”47 But, paradoxi-
cally, it is neither the specific direction that emotion takes in escaping the 
circle of self-regard and interest,48 nor the object of love that matters here; 
“its form is not dependent on its content.”49 Indeed, though this love goes 
through humanity, it is ultimately objectless (“humanity” being more than 
the assemblage of all human beings, for Bergson, and hence not an object 
that can be aimed at). By “forward movement [marche en avant],” Bergson is 
not evoking the idea of gradual or developmental progress;50 rather, he points 
to a qualitative change that makes a “difference in kind,” so that one is no 
longer turning around in place (hence, he also says “leap [saut]”). Thus, while 
there is a concept of progress in Les deux sources, Bergson explicitly localizes 
it within closed societies (though some seepage will occur, as we shall see). 
Two aspects of this account should make us hesitate. But they find 
limited critical discussion in the literature (since they are generally taken as 
complements, completing rather than undermining Bergson’s philosophy). 
First, aspiration in Les deux sources is a new, teleological force for Bergson’s 
philosophy—one that assigns an end goal that “completes” the movement of 
the famous élan vital. While this end should not be read as a state of rest, 
it does define a form of movement as that which we should performatively 
(and normatively) aspire to. Though Bergson is ambiguous as to whether 
pure aspiration is a virtual limit or could be actualized,51 his method in Les 
deux sources will require the existence of actualized models, taking the Christ 
of the Gospels as complete exemplar.52 In contrast, L’évolution créatrice puts 
aside the possibility of aspirational force, leaving the push of the élan to 
differentiate and diverge contingently and without finality (at the cost of 
impasses and failures on its way). In L’évolution créatrice, he says:
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Harmony, therefore, does not exist in fact; it exists rather in 
principle [. . .] Harmony (or rather “complementarity”) is revealed 
only in the mass, in tendencies rather than states. In particular 
(and this is the point on which finalism has been most seriously 
mistaken) harmony is rather behind us than ahead. It is due to 
an identity of impulsion and not to a common aspiration. It 
would be futile to try to assign to life an end, in the human 
sense of the word. To speak of an end is to think of a pre-existing 
model which has only to be realized. It is to suppose, therefore, 
that all is given, and that the future can be read in the present.53 
It should be clear from this that there can be no immanent aspiration or 
goal to life. The aspiration of the mystic individuals of Les deux sources is 
a supplement that takes up life but also transcends it. The conditions of 
possibility of this aspiration are not immanent to life, rather they need to 
be created through the performative actions of mystics themselves. It is, 
in this sense, that Les deux sources describes the way aspiration proceeds as 
follows (here, the example is the transition from relative to absolute justice):
The method consisted in supposing possible what is actually 
impossible in a given society, in imagining what would be its 
effect on the soul of society, and then inducing some such 
psychic condition by propaganda and example: the effect once 
obtained, would retroactively complete its cause; new feelings, 
evanescent indeed, would call forth the new legislation seemingly 
indispensable to their appearance, and which would then serve 
to consolidate them.54
Leaving aside the worries a democratic sensibility may have about 
this passage (while Bergson is describing justice, the procedure itself is nei-
ther deliberative nor necessarily democratic), I want to point to a second 
problem with the account of openness in Les deux sources. While Bergson 
uses the terms open and closed in his previous texts, they are neither guid-
ing nor framing concepts there. In L’évolution créatrice, for instance, to be 
open means to be, at once, unpredictable and incomplete. Anything for 
which time makes a difference—living bodies of all sorts, the whole mate-
rial universe, as well as any parts of matter that are not artificially isolated 
within this universe—is open.55 Although life has a tendency to closure, by 
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materializing into species and individuating into separate organisms, this 
does not stop them from becoming and aging.56 In this account, what are 
closed are artificially isolated systems of matter that can be treated as inert 
and reversible—although Bergson’s famous example of having to wait for 
the sugar to dissolve in a sugared-water mixture is supposed to show that 
such isolated systems are matters of perceptual closing and theoretical con-
struction.57 Thus to be open is to become, to have duration.58 It would not 
make sense to ask, here, what this might be an opening to. In contrast, the 
openness of Les deux sources is both too much and too little. Too much, 
because it posits an aspirational openness that is measured according to a 
prospective limit or end—that to which it is supposed to be open. Too 
little, because the concept of “open to” is left empty and contentless, while 
normatively weighted. It appears to wait to be retrospectively filled, but 
already anticipates and prefigures what is to come, since Bergson sees this 
emptiness actualized as objectless and mystical love. At the same time, clo-
sure comes to be defined by indifference to this aspiration or lack of effort 
in following it through. The borders of open/closed have thus shifted, as 
has the sense and usage of the terms; they become even more sharply and 
normatively distinguished once the difference between static and dynamic 
religion comes into focus. With this I will turn to the central chapters of 
Les deux sources and the question of method.
Open/Closed: Questions of Method
It is in the central chapters of Les deux sources, on static and dynamic reli-
gion respectively, that the method of the book becomes clear. Static and 
dynamic religion are not extensions or foundations of the two moralities, 
but run in parallel, bolstering the closed and open ways of life.59 Specifically, 
it is because intellect hesitates and resists in cases of obligation—through 
both self-interest and fear—that a social counterweight is needed to assure 
against this hesitation, “disorganization,” or “depression.”60 This is the 
role of the “fonction fabulatrice” that defines static religion for Bergson, 
a defensive reaction of nature against the “dissolvent power” and risks of 
reflective consciousness.61 Static religion creates ideas that have the force of 
perception (“idéo-motrices”), that structure and make sense of the world, and 
that strengthen the attachment to life.62 It is in this context that Bergson 
criticizes Lévy-Bruhl for assigning to “primitive mentality” a different logic.63 
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For Bergson, both “civilized” and “non-civilized” societies have in common 
not only the ground of obligation (the obligation to have obligations), but 
also the risks of reflective consciousness and the “fonction fabulatrice,” which 
is needed to assure against these risks. Static religion, like the structure of 
obligation in general, is hence “natural” to human societies; it is not only 
a means of social conservation, but also a tendency to closure.
Thus, for Bergson, both so-called primitive and civilized societies 
are on the side of closure. But lest we think all difference is dissolved, 
Bergson introduces a way of measuring the difference of degree between 
coexistent social formations. This relies on distinguishing, on the one 
hand, “le primitif [the primitive]” of humanity—which is taken to underlie 
cultural acquisitions and points to a virtual foundation or origin that can 
only be probabilistically described—from “les primitifs,” who are actually 
coexistent societies.64 While much more can be said about this distinction, 
Bergson’s argument proceeds in three steps. First, he insists that “we are 
only acquainted with humanity as already evolved, for the ‘primitives’ we 
observe today are as old as we are.”65 As soon as coexistence is established, 
however, it is forestalled and deferred. For, second, this means that they 
“have had plenty of time to exaggerate and to aggravate, as it were, the 
possible irrationalities contained in elementary tendencies, natural enough 
though they are.”66 “Marking time [piétinant sur place],” Bergson continues, 
“they ceaselessly add and amplify. Through the double effect of repetition 
and exaggeration the irrational passes into the realm of the absurd, and the 
strange into the realm of the monstrous.”67 Humanity, it seems, has aged 
equally but differently; and this differential way of living the same interval 
of duration marks an irreversible threshold from which one cannot recover. 
Third, though partly accidental, this also shows a lack of effort or “paresse,” 
which deepens the effects of irrational practices, so that “[s]ubsequently, it 
was too late; the society could not advance, even if it wanted to, because 
it was contaminated by the products of its own laziness [. . .] the practices 
of magic.”68 It is no wonder that Donna Jones sees an implicit justification 
for colonial (and missionary) intervention here.69
Little by little, after dissolving any difference in nature, Bergson shores 
up the difference of degree between “civilized” and “primitive,” so that it 
is finally their very duration that works against “the primitives.” Within 
closed societies, then, there are degrees of progress with a new distinction 
at play: that between stagnating societies (“piétinant sur place”) and “societ-
ies in movement.”70 Their actual difference owes to the degree and form of 
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accumulation of cultural acquisitions, and hence to the thickness of layering 
that covers over the same nature.71 Since Bergson has already rejected any 
inheritance of acquired traits, it is through social milieu that he explains 
how acquisitions are transmitted, arguing that they accumulate superficially 
in one case and intensify in depth in another.72 Moreover, while mystics 
emerge in all societies, according to Bergson, the mystic call will find an 
easier foothold and greater receptivity in societies that are already in move-
ment; there will be a more fluid acceptance of changing habits.73 
Given that “les primitifs” only differ in degree, it may appear that 
they are unnecessary to Bergson’s method in Les deux sources. Indeed, 
Bergson suggests early on that “the observation [. . .] of civilized man of 
the present day” may be sufficient; all one would need is an introspective 
method, what Bergson has elsewhere called intuition, to get at “l’humanité 
primitive” (i.e., nature) within everyone.74 Yet if we read deeper, Bergson 
seems to need “the primitives,” just as he needs actual mystics, to make his 
method work. What is this method and what use are “the primitives” put 
to in this method? Bergson describes his “probabilistic” method in Les deux 
sources as one that begins in experience, but also extends the tendencies of 
experience to their virtual extremes, in order to find their intersections or 
conditions. The method is at once empirical and metaphysical. Here is his 
most succinct description:
We have alluded elsewhere to those “lines of fact [lignes de fait]” 
each one indicating but the direction of truth, because it does 
not go far enough: truth itself, however, will be reached if two 
of them can be prolonged to the point where they intersect. 
A surveyor measures the distance to an unattainable point by 
taking a line on it, now from one, now from the other, of two 
points which he can reach [L’arpenteur mesure la distance d’un 
point inaccessible en le visant tour à tour de deux points auxquels 
il a accès].75
The analogy to the surveyor makes us see that Bergson needs two accessible 
points of experience to which he can move (at least imaginatively), in order 
to triangulate from them the desired point of intersection (the conditions of 
both experiences in duration). The experience of mystics provides one such 
point, allowing Bergson to imagine, or more precisely “intuit,” a tendency to 
openness that he calls “élan d’amour.”76 But the second point is provided by 
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“primitives.” Since Bergson believes that theirs is a thinner layer of cultural 
acquisitions, “the road may be shorter” to arrive at the tendency to closure 
that grounds social life, the pressure that explains not only obligation but 
also static religion.77 Indeed, this method instrumentalizes both “primitives” 
and “mystics” in order to guide introspection to find the natural and mystical 
tendencies within the self.78 That this introspection requires external support 
or auxiliaries is key. The tendencies, Bergson explains in Les deux sources, 
need to be grasped at their culmination or completion, “à son terme,” in 
order to be understood.79 These end points are inexistent; for all we have 
is the mixture or composite which is experience.80 But both mystics and 
“primitives” come closer to the extreme, and hence trace out the angle of 
the direction at which the surveyor can aim.
This is what Vladimir Jankélévitch has called “le maximalisme bergsonien” 
(though he did not mean this critically).81 Les deux sources inscribes a teleol-
ogy of life, which the rest of Bergson’s philosophy had disavowed (at most 
we can find an “inverted” or retrospective finalism in L’évolution créatrice). 
Bergson is able to claim this teleology, while remaining (relatively) consistent 
with his previous work, because it is a teleology that is not immanent to 
life, but emerges from the resumption of its creative effort by the actual 
mystics whose experience he relies on. According to Bergson, the mystic is 
situated “at a point that the spiritual current, in its passage through matter, 
probably wanted to reach but could not [aurait probablement voulu, jusqu’où 
il n’a pas pu aller].”82 The mystic here delineates a future, an aspirational end. 
But I would add that there is also a minimalism in Les deux sources. 
Although the extreme that lies at the end of the other tendency, “primitive 
humanity,” is just as inexistent a limit as that of the pure mystic, Bergson 
thinks that its direction, too, can be externally traced through descriptions 
of actual “primitives.” While this “nature” is supposed to follow the same 
vital schema as in L’évolution créatrice, there are important differences in 
its conception of closure. The closure of the organism was always also an 
opening—becoming, aging, and undoing—whereas the closure of obligation 
goes to an extreme and takes the form of a virtual instinct that has become 
quasi-automatic. That both the tendency to openness and the tendency 
to closure go to the extreme is confirmed by Bergson in the final chapter 
of Les deux sources, when he articulates this as a law, “la loi de double fré-
nésie.”83 Whereas in biological life, tendencies divide and diverge in order 
to develop into coexistent species, he posits that in psychological and social 
life tendencies develop successively and go as far as possible, “comme s’il y 
avait un bout [as if there was an end].”84 In other words, these tendencies 
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proceed to completion—a strange turn for a philosophy that had always 
defined duration by its incompleteness and unpredictability.
At first glance, the method of Les deux sources seems to be a continuation 
of that outlined in Matière et mémoire (1896), almost forty years earlier.85 
Bergson certainly presents it as such, a gesture that may have misled his 
readers. But a closer reading of the method of Matière et mémoire shows 
us the elided possibilities of Bergson’s philosophy: “It would be to take 
experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn [au-dessus de ce 
tournant] where, taking a bias in the direction of our utility, it becomes 
properly human experience.”86 While this may look like the same method, 
it is conceived differentially in Matière et mémoire, according to a differ-
ent calculus than the linear geometry of the surveyor. In other words, the 
tendencies of experience are extended to their limit, but this is a limit that 
remains virtual and whose actuality can only ever be grasped within the 
mixture of experience. Tendencies are extended according to their curves 
(differentially by taking the tangent), and not in a geometrical projection 
from two points. To follow through the movement of a tendency, its direc-
tionality must be grasped in process, neither at the beginning nor at its end, 
if end there be. In Matière et mémoire, the intersection of tendencies at 
their “source” is likened to the crossing of two railway lines that never fully 
coincide, but where we can cross imperceptibly from one to the other. This 
does not mean that one can make do without external support. Matière et 
mémoire relies heavily on the psychological studies of aphasia of its time, 
but it does so in order to exclude theoretical interpretations of memory as 
localized in the brain, not as positivist experiences.
How does this help us parse, or even decolonize, the Bergsonian dis-
tinction of open/closed? I have shown that this distinction needs to assume 
the actual existence of mystics and “primitives” as points of departure for 
its methodology, so that readers of Bergson’s Les deux sources cannot elide 
his discussion of “primitives” in the text, as I believe they have done in 
the literature. But there is a deeper problem. Les deux sources, as its title 
indicates, sets up a dichotomy between open and closed that, I think, Berg-
son’s philosophy cannot sustain. In Les deux sources, Bergson takes the open 
and closed tendencies as conditions of possibility, as guiding concepts, with 
which to search out actual experiences that can provide their confirmation: 
the mystic and “the primitives” provide such empirical mirrors. Yet these 
were already prefigured in the way the problem of sociality was posed in 
Les deux sources, so that Bergson’s method is skewed toward one of linear 
projection from assumed, external experiences.
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Conclusion: Half-Opening or Decolonizing Bergson?
It is by employing Bergsonian methods that the Bergsonian distinction of 
open/closed can be destabilized. Bergsonian intuition (read through Deleuze’s 
Bergsonism, but also through what Bergson says in the last chapter of Matière 
et mémoire and in L’évolution créatrice) is a method of discerning “pure” 
conceptual elements within any actual mixture.87 But the method does not 
rest with these virtual elements; rather, it understands these elements not 
as static states but as tendencies, and it traces them back to a multiplicitous 
and self-differentiating virtuality (duration) that links them and shows their 
interpenetration. This addition is crucial, for the originality and promise 
of Bergson’s method lies therein. Thus, memory (mind) and matter form a 
mitigated and interactive dualism that is traced back to different rhythms of 
duration in Matière et mémoire. Matter is an inversion, slowing down and 
undoing of the élan of life in L’évolution créatrice. To my mind, Les deux 
sources sets itself apart from Bergson’s other works by getting stuck in the 
distinction of open/closed that it presents. This despite Bergson’s warnings 
that there are no “pure” open or closed societies.88 This is because the open 
and the closed, while tendencies, are also sources; rather than tracing them 
back to a common virtual source, they are presented as a dichotomy. Yet 
we only need to recall L’évolution créatrice to find a common theme and 
explanation for these two tendencies: openness and closure are tendencies 
of life as it both evolves/creates and conserves; forms of life reflexively 
turn in on themselves and materially sediment but also age, grow, and 
become otherwise. Time (durée) is then, as it is in the rest of Bergson’s 
philosophy, the key to understanding openness (change, becoming-other) 
and closure (stasis, materialization, habit, and form). When open/closed are 
understood in this way, we perceive how they are, in fact, inseparable sides 
of temporal becoming. Openness and closure are here relative tendencies; 
both are necessary, neither is normative nor moralized. Moreover, tendency 
is not a teleology in this picture, but itself changes orientation and direc-
tion as time passes. Tendencies, whatever their directionality, are themselves 
half-open.
But how is a tendency half-open? Tendency connotes not simply 
movement, but “nascent change of direction.”89 Its course is structured at 
once by hesitation and delay and by elaboration as invention. To hesitate 
is to feel one’s way tentatively and receptively. Tendency is “tâtonnement,” 
to use Bergson’s term; it is a search without finality, an experimentation 
and elaboration that does not dictate the future it will find.90 But neither 
is the past a self-same or congealed idea, on this account. Though the past 
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as a virtual whole pushes on each present, actualizing itself there, this past 
is dynamically reconfigured through the passage of events and through the 
creation of possibility that ripples back from these events (their virtualiza-
tion). The past is not a container that accumulates events, but the continuous 
immanent transformation of directionality and sense that is tendency.91 This 
implies, for Bergson, that the whole is not given, that there is no comple-
tion or closure for an enduring reality—whether in terms of the future or 
at the level of the past.
Rather than understanding the social realm in terms of the open and 
the closed, I would suggest that a more productive, and more difficult, 
concept would be that of the half-open (entr’ouvert). Jankélévitch, in his 
reading of Bergson, suggests that this is precisely what Bergson has missed 
about Judaism; that the gesture of opening is what we should attend to, 
and that to be completely open is to be nothing at all.92 If we recall Walter 
Mignolo’s criticism that opening is not yet decolonizing, then more would 
be required.93 Is it possible to find a way of thinking the mixture of experi-
ence as more than a mixture, but as different temporalities and tendencies 
that run across each other as vortices?
I think that Bergson’s early texts preserve the possibility for such a 
decentered and decolonizing temporality, a possibility that is foreclosed in 
Les deux sources. This possibility requires thinking temporal multiplicity: the 
nonhierarchal coexistence of rhythms of becoming and ways of life, their 
coevalness to use Johannes Fabian’s term.94 Most importantly, it presupposes 
a nonlinear theory of time, where the past coexists and is reconfigured with 
the present; as a whole or network of relations that includes the present, 
the past is not determinately closed or gone, but “half-open,” capable of 
being inscribed with new structures of possibility.95 It is this opening of 
the past that grounds the unpredictability of the future. And it is this that 
allows other ways of being and thinking to make a difference for, and to 
reconfigure, our sedimented conceptual schemas themselves.
This conceptual shift from the open/closed to the half-open means 
that, in the social sphere, we can understand how people who share a history 
of oppression may wish to conserve their identity, without being subsumed 
to the cosmopolitan ideal of a shared humanity, or “love of humanity,” in 
which they are asked to renounce their resentiment. Openness is no longer 
the equivalent of progressiveness or perfectibility, and closure is no longer a 
moral or political failure, as they are in our common liberal parlance; neither 
openness nor closure can be used to justify assimilation or domination.
One last note. Bergson opens La pensée et le mouvant with a discussion 
of the abstraction and lack of precision of philosophical systems that apply 
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ready-made concepts to all the phenomena they encounter. He proposes, 
instead, a method of local knowledge that takes its point of departure in 
the realities it engages with and that creates concepts as responses to these 
calls. These concepts, which he calls “intuitive,” will not be immediately 
understood but may, with time, uncertainly, create their own conditions of 
intelligibility, as their mobile sense is reflected back from the phenomena 
they seek to illuminate.96 I would suggest that the open and the closed 
are the kinds of ill-fitting concepts that Bergson describes. Whether the 
half-open will fare better depends on the nuance and complexity it makes 
perceptible, how it allows us to perceive differently. But in making us think 
and questioning complacency, it fulfills one criterion of Bergsonian local 
and situated thinking: to judge concepts by what they enable us to do and 
the conditions of possibility they help create. 
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